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Heraclitus, Seaford and Reversible Exchange 
 
Abstract 
In this essay we identify a characteristic pattern of Heraclitus’ thought and language, 
the “figure of reversible exchange”. We suggest that this figure allows Heraclitus to 
propose an ontological structure consisting of two intersecting circuits of relations: a 
pre-temporal reversible exchange between Being and Becoming and between One and 
Many, and a temporal reversible exchange within the Many as the very process of 
Becoming. Against Richard Seaford’s interpretation of Heraclitus’ thought as a 
reflection of a new world-view predicated on universal exchange-value, the Heraclitus 
fragments will be read as suggesting that exchange-value emerges within rhythms of 
concrete, temporal use-value. We shall argue that this instantiates the wider relation 
Heraclitus proposes between Being and Becoming.  
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A ‘figure of reversible exchange’ can be discerned in the fragments of Heraclitus, 
Again and again we encounter this rhetorical pattern: in the first part of a fragment 
multiplicity is framed and contained within unity, only for this movement 
subsequently to be inverted. This inversion, a chiasmus, is not merely a discursive 
tool of emphasis through contrast; its usage in forming watery and unstable contrasts 
between the Many and the One, and between Becoming and Being, suggests that the 
figure operates in Heraclitus with metaphysical stakes. An invitation to an analysis of 
the philosophical stakes of the language of the Heraclitus fragments has long been 
open: whereas in the Rhetoric (III, 5) Aristotle criticizes Heraclitus for a lack of 
clarity caused by inadequate punctuation, Hegel suggested that precisely the fluidity 
of syntax represents and operates a ‘profound speculative thought’, in which ‘the 
identity which is affirmed between subject and predicate is seen equally to affirm a 
lack of identity between subject and predicate’.
i
 In recent years Poster has urged 
recognition that Heraclitus’s surviving fragments can be productively read as 
embodying ‘the rhetorical and hermeneutic consequences of an ontology of flux 
within a tradition of religio-philosophical rhetoric’, since language itself is ‘part of a 
radical instability of the world’.
ii
 With caution but also a sense of adventure – we are 
not classical philologists – we here offer reflections which aim to develop such a 
reading of Heraclitus. It will be argued that Heraclitus presents an account of Being 
and Becoming not as a stable opposition but rather as moments within a differential 
movement, a rhythm. In contrast to any strict division between appearance and reality, 
Heraclitus enacts this radical thought of Being and Becoming at the very surface of 
his text.  
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In particular, our reading of Heraclitus has been prompted as a response to 
Richard Seaford’s Money and the Early Greek Mind and Cosmology and the Polis, 
two recent monographs in which he presents an account of pre-Socratic Greek 
philosophy as a projection of socio-economic developments in an emergent monetary 
economy. Rather than presenting a definitive reading of Heraclitus, our aim here is to 
productively destabilise the account offered by Seaford, who subsumes Heraclitus 
into the tradition that preceded him, producing a Heraclitus whose philosophy situates 
particular concrete exchanges within the universal of exchange-value. If Heraclitus is, 
we argue, read in the context of the process of monetisation, attention to the figure of 
reversible exchange undermines the attempt to ground exchange within universal 
exchange-value, to resolve difference within an undisturbed identity. His thought and 
his discourse situate such an idea as a moment and reification of the rhythms of 
concrete, temporal use-value, an instance in the wider relation he proposes between 
Being and Becoming. It will be suggested that Heraclitus proposes an ontological 
structure consisting of two intersecting circuits of relations: a pre-temporal reversible 
exchange between Being and Becoming and between One and Many, and a temporal 
reversible exchange within the Many as the very process of Becoming. Offering a 
further potential value of this reading of Heraclitus, we close by considering that part 
of Nietzsche’s sense of growing distance from Schopenhauer – central to his own 
philosophical development - was occasioned by a reading of Heraclitus with parallels 
to the one presented here. 
 
The figure of reversible exchange 
Throughout the fragments of Heraclitus we encounter a frequent juxtaposition of One 






40/90, 50/12, 54/41, 83/53, 119/64, 121/66, 123/67 and 124/10 (as well as, implicitly, 
in the fragments concerned with the “unity of opposites”). This pattern of 
juxtaposition pervades even apparently non-ontological domains of Heraclitus’ 
thought, such as fragments of a more political slant: frr. 30/114, 62/39, 63/49, 64/121, 
97/29. In this, Vlastos observes, Heraclitus can be read as engaging with a terrain of 
philosophical thought shaped by Anaximander’s stark division between Being and 
Becoming; we would argue, however, that Vlastos (like Seaford) overemphasises the 
continuity between Anaximander and Heraclitus.
v
 Whereas Anaximander’s thought 
pivots on a radical opposition between unity and multiplicity, this opposition is 
figured in Heraclitus such that it repeatedly wavers and collapses; the One is 
dispersed into or already contains the Many. As Schindler has proposed, the 
Heraclitus fragments can be productively read as ‘responding to Anaximander, who 
seems to have viewed the differentiation of things from each other as an act of 
injustice requiring expiation’: 
 
For Heraclitus, by contrast, a view such as Anaximander’s would 
undermine the equiprimordiality of unity and difference; thus, there is 
indeed a kind of strife implied in differentiation, but this is not an 
injustice, but justice itself, precisely because the manyness of the world is 
in itself good: strife is justice because the opposition implied in 




Let us examine fr. 123/67: 
 
 5 
o9 qeo\v h9me/rh eu0fro/nh xeimw_n qe/rov po/lemov ei0rh/nh ko/rov limo/v. 
a)lloiou=tai de o3kwsper o9ko/tan summigh=| quw&masin o0noma&zetai kaq’ 
h9donh\n e9ka&stou.vii 
 
[The god day night winter summer war peace satiety hunger. It changes 
just as when, mingled with perfumes, it is named according to the scent of 
each.] 
 
This fragment has often been seen as an assertion of the underlying unity of the 
oppositional pairings of the first sentence, with the qeo/v as a proto-Aristotelian 
u9pokei/menon [substrate] in accordance with Aristotle’s reading of Heraclitus as a 
material monist.
viii
 According to Robinson’s commentary, for instance, ‘its clear 
import is that change in the cosmos is never more than the incidental change of what 
is in itself changeless’.
ix
 Such a reading, however, rather hauls itself up by its own 
bootstraps, since contemporary commentaries have been influenced by Diels’ 
editorial insertion of pu=r before summigh|=. This reading, presuming that meaning must 
by definition be coherent, entirely ignores the dispersive syntactic movement of the 
first sentence: the opening nominative singular creates the expectation of a singular 
verb to frame the list of opposites, yet the fragment refuses such closure, leaving the 
sentence to open out into ever more nominatives, an assemblage never totalised as 
predicate of a verb. A reading bent on such closure also ignores the clear statement 
that this assemblage ‘changes’, with no suggestion of underlying identity.  
A similar dispersive refusal of closure occurs in fr. 54/41. The fragment 
commences with an emphatic singularity (‘e4n to\ sofo/n [one is the wise]’) but does 
not end likewise, opening instead into ‘kuberna~tai pa&nta dia_ pa&ntwn [everything 
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is steered through or by everything]’ where one might perhaps have expected dia_ 
e9no\v (as in frr. 119/64 and 30/114).x Heraclitus may allude here to a possible 
fragment of Anaximander preserved by Aristotle, that to\ a!peiron ‘perie/xein 
a3panta kai\ pa&nta kuberna~n [surrounds all things and steers all things]’.xi But 
whereas Anaximander’s syntax encloses the plural object within singular verbs, 
Heraclitus’ disperses the singular verb into multiplicity as both subject (pa&nta, 
neuter plural subject of a grammatically singular verb) and agent (dia_ pa&ntwn).  
The dispersive movement of One into Many is of particular sophistication in fr. 
83/53: 
 
po/lemov pa&ntwn me\n path/r e0sti, pa&ntwn de\ basileu/v, kai\ tou\v 
me\n qeou\v e1deice tou\v de\ a)nqrw&pouv, tou\v me\n dou/louv e0poi/hse 
tou\v de\ e0leuqe/rouv. 
 
[War is father of all, king of all, and some he shows as gods, others as 
men, some he makes slaves, others free]. 
 
The syntactic structure of the first clause permits a double framing of pa&ntwn by 
parallel nominative singulars, suggesting the containment of multiplicity within a 
unitary regulating order. This suggestion is reinforced by the sustained alliteration of 
word-initial labial plosives, which holds the entire clause within a single sonic unity. 
The teleological structure is familiar from the Anaximander fragment, which likewise 
deploys alliteration and framing to reinforce syntactic closure. In the Heraclitus 
fragment, the double repetition of me\n . . . de\ at first suggests that the balanced 
rhythm of the first clause will be replicated in the remaining clauses. Yet this 
 7 
expectation is at once inverted: the second and third clauses each frame singular verbs 
with plural objects, suggesting the dissemination of unity into multiplicity. Returning 
to the first clause, we find that the One governing pa&nta is not to\ a!peiron but 
po/lemov, grammatically singular but in sense irreducibly plural, as in fr. 82/80 
(‘gino/mena pa&nta kat’ e1rin [all things come to be in accordance with strife]’). 
In fr. 83/53, then, Heraclitus first frames and contains the Many within the One, 
then inverts this movement in the second and third clauses, dispersing the One back 
into the Many. Whereas the Anaximander fragment employs chiasmus solely to close 
the judicial arc of secession from and return to the One, here the fragment deploys 
chiasmus of syntactic organisation in a movement of reversible exchange between 
Many and One, One and Many. This chiastic figure of reversible exchange is at least 
as characteristic a pattern of Heraclitus’ thought and language as the figure of the 
‘geometric mean’ identified by Fränkel.
xii
 It is most apparent in fr. 124/10, where 
unity is produced from multiplicity only to reproduce multiplicity from itself: 
 
sulla&yiev: o3la kai\ ou0x o3la, sumfero/menon diafero/menon, suna|~don 
dia|~don, e0k pa&ntwn e4n kai\ e0c e9no\v pa&nta. 
 
[Graspings: wholes and not wholes, converging diverging, consonant 
dissonant, from all things one and from one thing all]. 
 
The closed arc of Anaximander’s fragment is re-opened both by the inversion in order 
of becoming-One and becoming-Many and by the quadruple repetition of the figure 




 It can be noted that even the divine One itself, so often held to underlie and 
totalise all differences, is structured at the surface of Heraclitus’ text according to a 
profound instability and reversibility between One and Many, and between signifier 
and signified. On the one hand, numerous fragments refer to various things (fire, war, 
strife, justice, a9rmoni/h [structure, adjustment], the wise, the qeo\v, ai0w_n [lifetime, 
eternity], and so forth) in such a way as to imply some position as divinity or cosmic 
principle. A complex network of interconnections and allusions is established 
between these terms; yet no identification between them is ever clinched. For 
example, frr. 54/41 and 119/64 are connected by two (different) verbs meaning 
‘steer’; should to\ sofo/n [the wise] thus be identified with kerauno/v [thunderbolt], as 
interchangeable signifiers for the same underlying signified? Is kerauno/v to be 
identified, as Hippolytus assumes,
xiv
 with pu=r [fire], which is itself potentially 
connected to numerous other terms? On the other hand, such terms are often used 
promiscuously; for example, sofo/n in fr. 118/32 connotes a divine principle, but in 
frr. 36/50 and 54/41 human wisdom, while in fr. 27/108 it hovers between the two 
senses.
xv
 Such a movement of signifiers is explicitly referred to in fr. 123/67, as well 
as in fr. 118/32: 
 
e4n to\ sofo\n mou=non le/gesqai ou0k e0qe/lei kai\ e0qe/lei Zhno\v o1noma. 
 
[The wise one alone is unwilling and willing to be called by the name of 
Zeus.] 
 




Many and one 
The figure of reversible exchange in Heraclitus stands in striking contrast to the 
philosophical and rhetorical relation between Many and One in the Anaximander 
fragment. The teleological structure of the Anaximander fragment, whereby the 
interchange of ta_ o1nta directs itself towards the realisation of justice and 
reproduction of unity, is predicated on the radical transcendence recorded in the term 
“a!-peiron”, which Diels translates “das grenzenlos-Unbestimmbare” (the limitless-
indeterminable).
xvi
 Limit, difference, multiplicity and transience characterise only that 
which has departed from Being. For Anaximander, the differential movement of ta_ 
o1nta is thus entirely exterior to to\ a!peiron, playing across its surface but not 
articulating its essence.  
In breaking open the closed cadences of teleology in the figure of reversible 
exchange, Heraclitus also breaks down the transcendence on which teleology is 
based: the One is no longer external to and prior to the Many, on the contrary the One 
is the Many, ‘e4n pa&nta ei]nai [one thing is all things or all things are one thing]’ (fr. 
36/50). Just as fr. 124/10 has been read in terms of the reconciliation of difference 
within unity, so the ambiguity of these words in fr. 36/50 has been widely ignored; 
not rhetorically structured according to the figure of reversible exchange, e4n and 
pa&nta are nonetheless syntactically reversible as subject and predicate.xvii If 
Heraclitus here asserts a unity beneath the multiple, he also defines that unity as 
multiplicity itself, articulated by difference to the full depth of its being.
xviii
  
The plausibility of such a reading of fr. 36/50 is strengthened by a series of 
fragments which situate the One as the differential structure of the Many, the very 
multiplicity of the multiple as such. First among these is fr. 50/12: 
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potamoi=si toi=sin au0toi=sin e0mbai/nousin e3tera kai\ e3tera u3data e0pirrei=. 
 
[Upon those stepping into the same rivers ever different waters flow.] 
 
The authenticity of this fragment has been much disputed, and will not be further 
debated here – save to note, in reply to Vlastos’ charge that the contrast between the 
sentence’s two cola is ‘milder than what one expects from Heraclitus’,
xix
 that watery, 
dissolute contrasts are entirely characteristic of the Heraclitean figure of reversible 
exchange. The contrast between the two cola of fr. 50/12 is established not only by 
the semantic opposition between toi=sin autoi=sin and e3tera kai\ e3tera, but also by 
the sudden sonic displacement of diphthongs (principally oi=) by short vowels, of 
heavy by light syllables, of sibilant and labial by dental and liquid consonants. Two 
dissimilar sound worlds are articulated, such that in the first colon the flow of breath 
is almost unbroken, while in the second it is fractured and discontinuous. Such an 
effect is reinforced by the displacement in the second colon of smooth by rough 
breathings, strongly sonically marking word-division, and by the shift from word-
medial (usually circumflex) accent in the first colon to word-initial (usually acute) 
accent in the second: the first colon flows smoothly from one word to the next, 
whereas in the second colon aspiration and sudden pitch elevation split the words 
jaggedly from one another. The sonic continuity of the first colon is further 
strengthened by the near-homoioteleuton of all four of its words, creating a smoothly 
repetitive rhyme pattern. 
The semantic contrast between One and Many, the continuous flow of the 
river and the displacement of waters, is thus sonically articulated across the two 
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halves of the fragment. We may perhaps identify in Heraclitus’ reliance on sound 
effects to create meaning a partial solution to a question which has long puzzled 
commentators: why does Heraclitus speak of ‘those stepping’ in the plural?
 
Certainly 
the plural is awkward in terms of sense; but the sonic contrast is severely weakened if 
e0mbai/nousin is replaced by e0mbai/nonti. The remainder of the solution, however, lies 
in the fragment’s syntactic dynamics. Not only e0mbai/nousin but also potamoi=si 
toi=sin au0toi=sin is given in the plural, where sense might have dictated the singular; 
conversely, in the second colon Heraclitus exploits the Greek usage of singular verb 
with neuter plural subject (as at frr. 54/41, 93/88). If the sonic contrast between the 
fragments establishes an opposition between unity and multiplicity, syntax is 
deployed to subvert such an opposition, such that we encounter multiplicity already 
within unity and vice versa. 
Such a counterpoise of sound and syntax is not merely a dramatisation of the 
sense of the fragment. It also alludes to the pervasive figure of reversible exchange, 
which likewise both opposes One to Many and renders porous the boundary between 
them. In fr. 50/12, however, this figure is drawn in and overlaid upon itself. In other 
instances of the figure, the opposition of One and Many necessarily precedes the 
movement of exchange between them; each is stolidly presented before it can be 
volatilised towards the other, as in frr. 124/10 (e0k pa&ntwn e4n kai\ e0c e9no\v pa&nta) 
and 36/50 (e4n pa&nta ei]nai). Refusing the strictly chiastic structure in fr. 50/12, 
Heraclitus determines the One already as the Many, the Many already as the One; 
reversible exchange here passes into an identity in which the One is thought as the 
structure of the Many. If the fragment’s first colon sonically pictures the unity of the 
river as continuous flow (of breath, of water), the second colon dissolves flow (r9o/ov) 
into the very movement of waters in the verb e0pirrei=, apparently singular yet 
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semantically plural. Flow is the very structure of difference (e3tera kai\ e3tera) with 
relation (e3tera kai\ e3tera), that which remains perpetually the same (potamoi=si 
toi=sin au0toi=sin) only in the constant interchange of waters. In fr. 50/12, alluding to 
the figure of reversible exchange yet raising it to a higher power, we encounter the 
metaphysical stakes of this figure: that which remains the same is the structure of 
inter-relation which articulates the Many in its multiplicity, the One is the Many. 
 
 
Seaford and exchange-value in fr. 40/90 
Having now identified the figure of reversible exchange in the Heraclitus fragments, 
let us consider the impact of our analysis on a significant recent interpretation of 
Heraclitus. An instance of the figure of reversible exchange in the Heraclitus 
fragments occurs in fr. 40/90: 
 
puro\v a)ntamoibh\ ta_ pa&nta kai\ pu=r a(pa&ntwn o3kwsper xrusou= 
xrh/mata kai\ xrhma&twn xruso/v. 
 
[For fire all things are an exchange and fire for all things, just as goods for 
gold and gold for goods.] 
 
This fragment plays a decisive role in Richard Seaford’s interpretation of the 
Heraclitean cosmos in Money and the Early Greek Mind and Cosmology and the 
Polis. Like other sixth-century Ionian philosophers from Anaximander onwards, 
Heraclitus’ thought is understood as a projection of ‘the power of money to unify all 
goods and all men into a single abstract system’.
xx
 In making this claim, Seaford is 
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not simply in agreement with Marx, who suggests that the idea of money as ‘a 
general, eternal quality of nature’ works to justify and naturalise ‘the eternity and 
harmoniousness of the existing social relations’.
xxi
 Rather, Seaford aligns his 
interpretation with the first few lines of an aphorism in Adorno’s Minima Moralia: 
‘metaphysical categories are not merely an ideology concealing the social system; at 
the same time they express its nature, the truth about it, and in their changes are 
precipitated those in its most central experiences.’
xxii
 For Seaford, the projection of 
money into the cosmos by the Milesian philosophers does not simply reify and 
naturalise emergent capital exchange, but is also a precipitate of the experience of this 
new socio-economic formation. 
Accepting Plato’s reading in the Cratylus (402a) of Heraclitus as a theorist of 
universal flux or exchange, Seaford connects this to the fluid circulation of 
commodities and coinage within a monetary economy. Such circulation is possible 
only on the basis of an abstract, numerical exchange-value which transcends all 
commodities and of which they are representations: ‘like Heraclitean fire…monetary 
value is a single entity that in a sense persists (albeit transformed) throughout all 
exchanges’.
xxiii
 As Seaford argues in Cosmology and the Polis, ‘Monetised society 
and the Herakleitean cosmos are both informed by an unlimited cycle of constant 
transformation governed by an abstract formula (logos) embodied in a single element 
(fire) that is exchanged into and from all things “like goods for gold and gold for 
goods”.’
xxiv
 Seaford argues that the birth of ‘modern money’ in the sixth-century polis 
requires the development of fiduciarity, the communal attribution to coins of 
exchange-value in excess of their use-value, such that the value of a coin inheres in it 
not immediately and concretely but indirectly as a sign of universal exchange-value. 
This logic of signification is applied also to commodities exchanged for coins: 
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commercial transactions are understood as the interchange of replaceable signifiers 
for the same signified. The fluid exchangeability of commodities and coinage thus 
corresponds to and relies upon the absolute, qualitatively undifferentiated 
homogeneity of numerical exchange-value, the transcendent measure permitting 
quantitative commensuration of all goods. The qualitative specificity of different 
objects, as of parties to exchange with potentially quite opposed interests, is 
neutralised by monetisation. All exchange is contained and regularised within a 
unitary system governed by a homogeneity which traverses but is not itself articulated 
by the difference between objects: ‘in Herakleitos this unity of opposites is constantly 
transformed into a cycle by the cosmic logos-in-fire, and all things are one (fire): this 




Seaford’s reading accords the reversibility of the One-Many exchange a 
leading role in the development of Greek philosophy: ‘[in] presocratic 
metaphysics…universal power belongs to an abstract substance which is, like money, 
transformed into and from everything else. Presocratic metaphysics 
involves…unconscious cosmological projection of the universal power and universal 
exchangeability of the abstract substance of money’.
xxvi
 Yet the reversible 
transformation between One and Many, pu=r and pa&nta is itself founded on the 
transcendent unity which embraces and contains exchange. Physical “money” may be 
exchanged for commodities, yet only because both physical money and commodities 
are representations of abstract “money”, just as for Seaford Heraclitus’ fire is ‘the 
substratum of all other things’ and ‘belong[s] to a separate kind of reality’.
xxvii
 Seaford 
contends that cosmic fire transcends all things (including, implicitly, mundane fire, 
just as abstract money transcends coinage) as the numerical measure, the me/tron or 
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lo/gov, which inheres in yet regulates elemental exchange.xxviii Far from the 
dissemination of One into Many as its immanent structure, for Seaford the figure of 
reversible exchange expresses the unlimited yet superficial exchangeability of the 
manifold within an essentially unitary cosmos. 
Yet the exchange between One and Many, gold and goods in fr. 40/90 of 
Heraclitus is more radically reversible than Seaford allows. The resistance of 
Heraclitus’ dictum to Seaford’s reading may be elucidated by means of a comparison 
with his reading of Anaximander, whose philosophy is likewise understood as a 
cosmological projection of incipient monetisation in Money and the Early Greek 
Mind.
xxix
 Seaford proposes that just as abstract exchange-value neutralises the 
qualitative difference between parties to a commercial transaction, so in Anaximander 
to\ a!peiron orders the interchange of qualitative opposites within a unitary system as 
debt and repayment: ‘in monetised exchange, as in the cosmology of Anaximander, 
opposites originate in, and embody, a single substance into which they are reabsorbed. 
So too the opposition between injurer and injured is resolved by the all-embracing 
power of monetary value to absorb the injury’.
xxx
 This monetary model is by no 
means incompatible with the political-judicial language on which the Anaximander 
fragment explicitly draws; between monetisation and the development of polis-
thought, including legal thought, Seaford identifies both structural isomorphism and 
extensive historical complicity. In particular, Seaford points to the development of 
judicial practices of compensation for offences; the transcendent justice which 
regulates and contains the difference of parties is interpreted as identical with abstract 
exchange-value, permitting the commensuration of offence and compensation as debt 
and repayment. In projecting the structure of justice in the Solonian polis onto the 
cosmos, on Seaford’s reading the Anaximander fragment thus determines the 
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conflicting o1nta as commensurable signs of abstract exchange-value, which 
simultaneously permits the circulatory exchange of opposites and totalises it within a 




It is here that Heraclitus’ fr. 40/90 diverges radically from the Anaximander 
fragment and thus from Seaford’s attempt to enclose both within a single movement. 
In Anaximander, the monetary-judicial model is alluded to in the third colon of each 
of the two sentences of the fragment, in the terms ta&civ (ordering, assessment of 
compensation owed) and xrew&n (necessity, with a possible allusion to xre/ov ‘debt’). 
Exchange-value stands syntactically outside the conflict of opposites, governing the 
chiastic pendulum-swing whereby a0diki/a is balanced against di/kh. The rhetorical 
structure of the fragment thus mirrors the structure of Solonian justice, whereby the 
dispute is regulated from outside by an impartial, homogeneous measure. In 
Heraclitus’s text, this triple cadence is collapsed into the double cadence of reversible 
exchange, articulated here by a twin chiasmus (the first organised syntactically, the 
second lexically). The structure proposed by Seaford, and intended to encompass both 
Anaximander and Heraclitus, is essentially closed and threefold: the exchangeability 
of goods in a transaction, whether of commodities for each other or of commodity for 
physical money (coinage), is predicated on abstract money (exchange-value) which 
stands outside and underpins the movement of exchange. Money therefore stands 
either entirely outside the transaction in the case of barter, or simultaneously within 
and outside where there is the exchange of goods for money. In fr. 40/90 of 
Heraclitus, however, money appears solely within an open, radically reversible 
exchange which reproduces itself from chiasmus to chiasmus, and consists as much in 
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its exchangeability for goods as vice versa: ‘xrusou= xrh/mata kai\ xrhma&twn 
xruso/v’. 
The possible abstract sense of both xruso/v and xrh/mata as ‘money’ causes 
exchange-value to linger precisely in the resonance between xruso/v and xrh/mata, 
an insubstantial excess over the concrete sense of each. The shared ambiguity of both 
terms collapses the apparent opposition between them, situating their very (semantic) 
interchangeability as the structure of reversible exchange, of a)ntamoibh/. No longer 
an invariant substrate underlying replaceable signifiers, exchange-value thus inheres 
in the juxtaposition of interchangeable terms. The fragment thus would dramatise not 
the monetary structure, as Seaford claims, but the process of monetisation, whereby 
fiduciary exchange-value in excess of concrete use-value is abstracted from the 
exchangeability of commodities. Whereas in the Anaximander fragment the parties to 
the monetary-judicial exchange were held together in chiastic unity by a third term 
external to the exchange, here it is the chiastic structure of porous opposition between 
xruso/v and xrh/mata, of difference with relation, which provides the unity of the 
a)ntamoibh/, the common ground on which exchange is possible.  
This reading suggests itself also in the fragment’s sonic structure. Each half of 
the fragment displays an alliterative and assonantal coherence clearly demarcated 
from that of the other half, delimiting the internal unity of the reversible exchange 
relation. Within each half, however, this patterning also allows the opposed members 
of the pair to destabilise the other; such sonic bleeding-together is strengthened by the 
repeated reversible juxtaposition of terms according to the chiastic structure. The 
unity of the exchange does not precede the reversible exchangeability of its terms; 
rather, it consists only and immediately in the sonic interchangeability of pu=r and 
pa&nta, xruso/v and xrh/mata. Just as divinity exists at the surface of Heraclitus’ 
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text only in the convergence and divergence of its name(s), so the sonic coherence of 
each chiasmus exists only in the juxtaposition of different yet related terms.  
Further support for this reading is to be found in the term a)ntamoibh/, which 
not only connotes a commercial exchange of equal value,
xxxii
 but also ‘suggests some 
principle of compensation or retribution’.
xxxiii
 Alluding to Solonian judicial exchange-
value, Heraclitus replaces it immediately within (and sonically integrates it with) the 
exchange. The position of a)ntamoibh/ at the centre of the first exchange between 
nominative and genitive draws it towards the two substantives on either side of it; 
syntactically governing the relation between nominative and genitive, it is itself 
disseminated into that relation. (What a different effect the fragment would have 
produced had its first words been puro\v ta_ pa&nta a)ntamoibh\!). The effect is 
reinforced by the word-final accents of puro\v a)ntamoibh/ and the word-initial 
accents of ta_ pa&nta: the cadence of the sentence rises towards ta_ pa&nta, which 
thereby receives the primary emphasis. Rather than governing the dual cadence from 
outside, a)ntamoibh/ is thus held within its movement. After the first sub-clause, it is 
present only in the repeated movement of exchange between nominative and genitive. 
Under the proposed reading of fr. 40/90, then, the One is dispersed into the 
Many as the structure of interchange which articulates its multiplicity. As in fr. 50/12, 
the figure of reversible exchange is here overlaid upon itself. The apparent chiastic 
organisation of One and Many, Many and One implodes in the sonic and semantic 
promiscuity of its terms, such that the One, the ‘principle of compensation’, inheres in 
the very chiastic structure of interchange within the Many. We do not seek to 
challenge Seaford’s broad historical claims regarding the monetisation of the Greek 
world and its significance for the development of abstract philosophical thought in 
Ionia; but we do not see Heraclitus as fitting within the sweep of that development as 
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neatly as he proposes. In producing a reading of Heraclitus which differs only as a 
matter of progression from his reading of Anaximander, Seaford suffers from an 
overly rigid application of his model of early Greek philosophy as an ‘unconscious 
cosmological projection’ of monetary structure: ‘in Herakleitos the unity of opposites, 
expressed in form-parallelism, is in part a projection of the endless cycle of monetised 
exchange, in which the opposition between the parties to exchange derives in part 
from the ancient reciprocity of revenge. This latter, regulated by polis-enforced 
monetary compensation for injury, had earlier been projected onto the cosmos as an 
endless cycle by Anaximander’.
xxxiv
 Mapping the development of philosophy point 
for point onto the linear advance of monetisation in this way, Seaford leaves little 
room for the multiplicity of conflicting ideologies regarding metaphysics and/or 
exchange-value in the Archaic period. This is despite the fact that he specifically 
identifies Heraclitus as a figure critical of political and social developments in the 
period: ‘The Herakleitean cosmos is the projection, from the perspective of an 
individual relatively isolated from the polis [by his critical views], of the newly all-
pervasive and yet isolating power of monetised exchange’.
xxxv
 Seaford’s reading of 
the first few lines of Adorno’s aphorism from Minima Moralia – that in changes in 
the metaphysical thought of a society ‘are precipitated those in its most central 
experiences’ – excludes the possibility that this precipitate may critique rather than 
solely reflect the experiences in question; this exclusion, tellingly, runs counter to the 
very critique enacted in the rest of Adorno’s aphorism after the few lines extracted by 
Seaford.  
Fr. 40/90 does indeed allude to the structure of incipient monetised society, 
yet not simply as a fixed point of reference for the construction of a metaphysics by 
analogy; rather, it is better regarded as a sophisticated intervention in that structure, a 
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fusion of its terms which serves to trace and enact the constitutive instability of Being 
and/or universal exchange-value as moments within a deeper rhythm. In this, 
Heraclitus is not only in agreement with, but deepens with a specific and distinctive 
philosophical account, Marx’s insight that ‘the money form of an object is not an 
inseparable part of that object, but is simply the form under which certain social 
relations manifest themselves’.
xxxvi
 Yet whereas Marx foresees the end of alienation in 
the supersession of private property, the rhythm between Being and Becoming 
identified by Heraclitus operates in both elemental and in social life and has no 
conceivable end, because endings are apiece with its ongoing process. 
 
From abstraction to rhythm in frr. 39/31b and 37/30 
 
Subsidiary evidence for Seaford’s reading of Heraclitus as theorist of universal 
exchange-value comes from frr. 39/31b and 37/30, which, he argues, also apply the 
monetary structure to the cosmos. Let us consider each in turn: 
 
qa&lassa diaxe/etai kai\ metre/etai ei0v to\n au0to\n lo/gon o9koi=ov 
pro/sqen h]n h2 gene/sqai gh=. 
 
[Sea pours forth and is measured to the same amount that existed before 
becoming earth.] 
 
As Seaford demonstrates, lo/gov connotes ‘a unifying abstraction that transcends 
individual sense data’.
xxxvii
 It is this abstract sense that well suits it to express 
quantitative exchange-value, ‘quantity expressed as an abstraction’: hence its use of a 
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monetary ‘account’ from the fifth century or somewhat earlier.
xxxviii
 Its appearance in 
fr. 39/31b thus suggests to Seaford that Heraclitus’ elemental exchange is regulated 
according to an abstract quantitative principle, similar to that regulating commercial 
and judicial exchange in the early fifth-century polis (pp. 232-33). 
Once again, however, Heraclitus is not simply transcribing but actively 
intervening in contemporary usage patterns. The term lo/gov, typically used to 
express an abstract quantitative measure, is deployed here with a marked 
concreteness. Of the fifth-century inscriptions Seaford cites to establish the abstract 
sense of lo/gov, none has the phrase ei0v lo/gon; one uses kata_ to\n au0to\n lo/gon to 
specify a ‘rate’ in proportion to actual amount.
xxxix
 Similarly, Thucydides records that 
Tissaphernes agreed to pay for any extra ships above a fixed number ‘kata_ to\n 
au0to\n lo/gon [at the same rate]’, where the non-specific abstraction of this phrase 
encompasses however many ships are actually provided.
xl
 Whereas kata& thus implies 
a regulative principle independent of actual amounts being exchanged – as in the 
Anaximander fragment: ‘kata_ to\ xrew&n’, ‘kata_ th\n tou= xronou ta&cin’ – 
Heraclitus’ phrase ei0v to\n au0to\n lo/gon suggests a specific, concrete ‘amount’ up to 
which sea is measured.
xli
 It does not suggest an abstract rate or ‘formula’ (Seaford’s 
translation)
xlii
 governing all possible transactions. This phrase cannot simply be read 
as a quasi-adverbial phrase governing metre/etai, for which the unit of measure or 
yardstick is typically expressed by the dative or with kata&;xliii it connotes rather the 
actual result of the measurement. Further, as the only masculine noun hitherto, it must 
be the antecedent of o9koi=ov, the grammatical subject of both h]n and gene/sqai, 
though sense demands that both verbs refer to sea. So far from abstraction above the 
exchange of earth and sea, the lo/gov itself is here fused with sea and exchanged with 




Rather than bearing its usual sense of an abstract principle, then, the term 
lo/gov is re-applied with disruptive concreteness. Just as in fr. 40/90 xruso/v is re-
inserted into the very circulatory exchange it ostensibly regulates for contemporary 
polis-thought, so here the lo/gov is not preserved across but reproduced out of the 
interaction of earth and sea. Its sameness (to\n au0ton) is not external to the temporal 
structure of the reversible elemental cycle described in frr. 38/31a and 39/31b: 
whereas in the Anaximander fragment the monetary-judicial ‘assessment’ 
syntactically surrounds time (th\n tou= xronou ta&cin) and governs the rhythm of 
ge/nesiv and fqora&, here the lo/gov itself was one thing (h]n) and becomes another 
(gene/sqai), is itself folded into the movement of destruction and creation. Yet it acts 
also as the hinge of that movement. Positioned at the middle of this chiastic sentence, 
in the centre of its four verbs and framed by qa&lassa and gh=, the phrase ei0v to\n 
au0to\n lo/gon joins together two transformations from earth to sea and sea to earth. 
Itself produced and reproduced from the reversible cycle of transformation, it is also 
the very relational structure of that cycle; it binds the elemental opposites into a 
rhythmic unity which is itself traversed by temporal difference. 
A similar folding of atemporal transcendence into the temporal movement of 
the multiple is visible in fr. 37/30: 
 
ko/smon to\n au0to\n a(pa&ntwn ou1te tiv qew~n ou1te a)nqrw&pwn 
e0poi/hsen, a)ll’ h]n a)ei\ kai\ e1stin kai\ e1stai pu=r a)ei/zwon, a(pto/menon 
me/tra kai\ a)posbennu/menon me/tra. 
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[The ordering, the same of all, no god nor man made, but it was forever 
and is and will be ever-living fire, kindled in measures and quenched in 
measures.]  
 
At first, this sentence seems very much aligned with the position of Anaximander and 
other sixth-century Milesian philosophical thought, to which it may allude even in its 
first word. As Kahn demonstrates, the term ko/smov (originally ‘arrangement, 
adornment, good order’, whether physical, moral, military or social) was generally 
employed by the Milesian philosophers to refer to an organic whole whose parts are 
organised temporally and spatially in a unitary order, a ‘systematic unity in which 
diverse elements are combined’.
xlv
 The suggestion of Heraclitus’ apparent agreement 
with a metaphysical structure whereby difference is held within unity, time within the 
atemporal, is strengthened by the assertion of a identity encompassing multiplicity 
(to\n au0to\n a(pa&ntwn), as by the investment of ko/smov with the attributes of 
divinity: h]n a)ei\ kai\ e1stin kai\ e1stai alludes to the familiar Homeric formula for the 
gods a)ie\n e0o/ntev [ever-living],xlvi and for Anaximander to\ a!peiron is likewise 
‘a0qa&naton . . . kai\ a)nw&leqron [immortal . . . and indestructible]’, ‘a)i/dion . . . kai\ 
a)gh/rw [eternal . . . and ageless]’.xlvii Heraclitus’ words also suggest the transcendent 
realm of poetic-prophetic truth, likewise appropriated by the Milesian sages.
xlviii
  
Up to e0stai, fr. 37/30 thus situates itself in the domain of Milesian philosophy 
from Anaximander to Xenophanes, which reduces multiplicity to unity through the 
notion of ko/smov. The next words appear to continue this Milesian pattern, for they 
specify a material element or a)rxh/ from which the entire world of ko/smov is derived, 
a unity to govern its unitary order just as Anaximander’s a!peiron steers all things. 
Yet this a)rxh/ is immediately identified with ko/smov, rather than regulating it from 
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outside; the dualistic structure of Milesian thought, of a)rxh/ and ko/smov, is collapsed 
upon itself.
xlix
 If Anaximander’s opposition between a!peiron and o1nta is, as Seaford 
argues, modelled on the power of money as ‘universal measure’
l
 impersonally 
regulating transactions, fr. 37/30 of Heraclitus performs a re-concretisation of this 
power. Fire is not here a measure preserved in and governing the orderly 
transformation of other things, pace Seaford. It is itself subject to the cycle of 
exchange, is itself kindled and quenched. The choice of the internal accusative me/tra 
(rather than an adverbial usage of me/triwv), repeated immediately after each of the 
participles, and the use of the plural suggest not a single abstract measure standing 
outside the cycle, but its concrete result in each case, as in fr. 39/31b. Fire exists, after 
all, only in the material movement of continuous kindling and quenching, of exchange 
between fuel and ash or smoke; a flame is no more than the transformation or inter-
relation of things, just as a river is no more than the inter-relation of waters.
li
 Fire is 
not a thing, a ‘substratum’, but a process. As fire, then, the unitary ko/smov consists in 
and is produced out of a pre-temporal cycle between One and Many and by a 
temporal cycle within the Many: a double ontological structure of intersecting circuits 
of transformation and instability. 
Across the Heraclitus fragments, these two rhythms are overlaid onto each other 
in the deployment of the term a3ptomai, both ‘kindle’ and ‘touch, grasp’. For 
instance, fr. 90/26: 
 
a!nqrwpov e0n eu0fro/nh| fa&ov a3ptetai e9autw|~ a)posbesqei\v o1yeiv, 
zw~n de\ a3ptetai teqnew~tov eu4dwn, e0grhgorw_v a3ptetai eu4dontov.lii 
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[A man kindles a light for himself in the night when he is quenched in his 
eyes, and living he touches the dead man while asleep, awake he touches 
the sleeping man.] 
 
The application of a3ptomai and a)posbe/nnumai to parallel reversible cycles of the 
kindling and quenching of elements and human beings in fr. 90/26 not only supports 
our contention that the fire of fr. 37/30 be understood as the structure of differential 
convergence or ‘touching’ which produces itself as transformation, as the cycle of 
birth and death.
liii
 It also heightens the paradox already implicit in fr. 37/30, of a flame 
eternal and ever-living precisely in the interchange of kindling and quenching. Fire, 
the One which underpins the unity of ko/smov, lives in the birth and death of the 
Many, in the very temporal structure of multiplicity as ge/nesiv and fqora&; its 
atemporal transcendence (h]n a)ei\ kai\ e1stin kai\ e1stai) consists precisely in the 
ceaselessness of time. Rather than standing outside of time as an abstract universal, 
Being contrasted with Becoming, what is eternal is time itself, the ceaseless orbit of 
temporal (inter)change in elemental processes and in human life.
liv
 Time is the flame 





The figure of reversible exchange has here been identified as a characteristic pattern 
of Heraclitus’ thought and language. The reversible exchange within the Many, 
between earth and sea or between commodities and coins, is repeatedly fused in the 
Heraclitus fragments with that which transcends and regulates it in the context of in 
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sixth-century polis-thought. Its chiastic rhythm, confined by Anaximander to the 
realm of o1nta, infiltrates the undifferentiated stillness of to\ a!peiron, generating the 
figure of reversible exchange between One and Many as two interchangeable 
descriptions of one and the same structure: ‘o3la kai\ ou0x o3la, sumfero/menon 
diafero/menon’. The chiastic organisation of this figure thus replicates the 
interchangeability of the multiple, the double ontological structure of relation with 
difference which configures the multiple as such and produces itself as reversible 
exchange among its elements. The very multiplicity of the multiple, the pre-temporal 
double movement of divergence and convergence, difference and relation, is the unity 
which produces itself in time (and as time) as elemental exchange. In contrast to 
Seaford’s attempt to subsume Heraclitus within the general arc of the sixth-century 
Ionian philosophical tradition, we propose that Heraclitus deploys the figure of 
reversible exchange to destabilise the oppositions that structure this tradition.  
A parallel of both interpretations has played a fateful role in the history 
philosophy: in the extended criticism of Jacob Bernays’s interpretation of Heraclitus 
presented by Nietzsche in the unfinished essay Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter 
der Griechen, and in more detail in the lecture notes recently published as Die 
vorplatonischen Philosophen. These texts were written in the early 1870s, a critical 
formative period for Nieztsche’s thought. Like Seaford, Bernays reads Heraclitus, in 
continuity with prior Milesian metaphysics, as reducing difference to an underlying 
identity which remains the same throughout and despite transformation. For Bernays, 
as Nietzsche reads him, Heraclitus’ thought is an attempt to answer the fateful 
question posed at the limits of Anaximander’s thought: just how did Becoming 
emerge from Being, the realm of injustice from justice? Heraclitus (says Bernays) 
finds that such an emergence can only be explained if Being is itself already pregnant 
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with the seeds of injustice: the identity of Being is disturbed by an ‘innewohnende 
u3briv [indwelling hubris]’.lv Bernays’ ‘entire suggestion is to be rejected’,lvi for it 
transforms Heraclitus, the thinker of radical innocence, into the philosopher of a more 
total guilt even than Anaximander, a guilt not only of all Becoming before the 
judgement-seat of Being, but even at the kernel of Being itself. By contrast, central to 
Nietzsche’s account of Heraclitus is the claim that the latter’s philosophy is 
established in direct response to Anaximander as a deconstruction of the relation of 
transcendence between One and Many. (Here, as so often when reading Nietzsche’s 
early writings on pre-Socratic philosophy, we might pause to recognise the acuteness 
of his insights, and to recognise how much we might learn from these often-dismissed 
texts).  
In the early 1860s, Nietzsche explicitly and reciprocally models his reading of 
the history of Greek philosophy on his growing sense of distance from Schopenhauer, 
and the theoretical positions he takes in opposition to Schopenhauer on Heraclitus’ 
response to Anaximander.
lvii
 The two discourses, German and Greek, are inextricably 
inter-wound and overlaid in Nietzsche’s thought of the period, such that it is 
impossible to say that either provides the dominant paradigm for the other. Heraclitus 
generalizes the differential structure of the realm of o1nta in Anaximander, fusing it 
with Being rather than setting it radically apart. Likewise, Nietzsche’s 1873 essay 
‘Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne’ generalizes the difference between 
subject and object such that the Übertragung [transference, translation, transmission, 
metaphor] between the spheres of object and subject, known and knower becomes 
constitutive of subject and object as such. Nietzsche perceives that Schopenhauer, like 
Anaximander but unlike Heraclitus, opposes a temporal-differential realm of 
Becoming (the Vorstellung) to the atemporality of the Wille. The division of the 
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absolute Subject into subject and object in the passage from Wille into Vorstellung, 
acknowledged by Schopenhauer,
lviii
 is reconceptualised by Nieztsche not as suffering 
and penance but as a moment within a constitutive movement, following his 
interpretation of Heraclitus.
lix
 It is through entirely collapsing the Schopenhauerian 
Wille, already itself racked by the ceaseless passage into multiplicity, into relational 
difference that Nietzsche begins to delineate his own philosophy of immanence and 
innocence. The deconstructive movement of Greek philosophy from Anaximander to 
Heraclitus is replicated in relation to Schopenhauer by Nietzsche’s essay, which lays 
the foundation of his later philosophy of creative Kraft [force] and illusion: 
 
Zwischen zwei absolut verschiedenen Sphären wie zwischen Subjekt und 
Objekt giebt es keine Causalität, keine Richtigkeit, keinen Ausdruck, 
sondern höchstens eine ästhetisches Verhalten, ich meine eine andeutende 
Uebertragung, eine nachstammelnde Uebersetzung in eine ganz fremde 
Sprache. Wozu es aber jedenfalls einer frei dichtenden und frei 




[Between two absolutely different spheres as between subject and object 
there is no causality, no correctness, no expression, but at most an 
aesthetic relation, I mean a suggestive transference, a stammering 
translation into an entirely foreign language. Yet for this is required, in 




The opposition between One and Many, characteristic of Anaximander and of 
Schopenhauer, is volatilised by Heraclitus/Nietzsche in the thought of reversible 
exchange. This thought characterises the unity of all things not as their transcendent 
identity before or beneath all difference, but as the self-differing common to each 
which produces itself as temporal differing from its ‘opposite’, whether this be the 
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